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Trust and fertility in uncertain times
Arnstein Aassve, Marco Le Moglie and Letizia Mencarini
Bocconi University
Recent studies have shown higher uncertainty to be associated with fertility decline. This study considers the
role of social trust as a coping mechanism when general uncertainty increases. We analyse the fertility data of
Italian provinces from 2004 to 2013, thereby incorporating the period of economic recession, which
unexpectedly and exogenously increased uncertainty across the population. We find a robust and
significantly positive impact of social trust on fertility, which is stronger among younger age groups.
Moreover, we find that the buffer effect of trust decreases with the level of public childcare provision,
suggesting that low trust endowments may be counterbalanced through public policy.
Supplementary material is available for this article at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2020.1742927.
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Introduction
There are now numerous studies analysing the link
between uncertainty and fertility, a literature
spurred on by recent global events, including the
economic recession which began in the second half
of 2007 and the associated fertility decline (Sobotka
et al. 2011; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Vignoli et al.
2012; Goldstein et al. 2013; Myrskyla et al. 2013;
Kim et al. 2015; Kreyenfeld 2015; Graham et al.
2016; Matysiak et al. 2016; Comolli 2017). Though
not always stated explicitly, the underlying argument
of these studies is straightforward: since childbearing
involves an irreversible investment with long-run
consequences for resources and well-being, greater
uncertainty about future prospects will entice
couples to postpone and possibly forego childbearing
altogether. The way couples perceive and cope with
increasing uncertainty depends on their own attitude
to risk and their support network. Individuals and
couples who are more averse to taking risks are
more likely to postpone such irreversible investments
(Ranjan 1999; Schmidt 2008), and, at times of heigh-
tened uncertainty, risk-averse individuals will post-
pone more than risk lovers.
In terms of coping mechanisms, the extended
family is often touted as an important resource
from which individuals can draw support if needed,
though its role vis-à-vis fertility trends is ambiguous
(Livi-Bacci 2001). In contrast, social trust, a key
ingredient in the broader concept of social capital,
has received less attention in demography, despite
representing an important coping mechanism when
faced with uncertainty (Yamagishi and Yamagishi
1994; Yamagishi et al. 1998; Hofmann and Hohmeyer
2013). Moreover, social trust is associated with a
range of favourable outcomes (Fukuyama 1995;
Cook 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Bjørnskov
2007; Aghion et al. 2008, 2010; Algan and Cahuc
2010), including lower corruption (Uslaner 2002),
lower crime and delinquency (Buonanno et al.
2009), lower income inequality (Uslaner 2002),
better functioning of financial institutions (Guiso
et al. 2004), and spurring of economic growth (Helli-
well and Putnam 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak
and Knack 2001). Social trust is also positively corre-
lated with the quality of institutions and political par-
ticipation. The key argument is that social trust
enhances civic engagement and social cohesion of
the community where people reside (Knack 2002;
Uslaner 2002) and, as such, brings about positive
characteristics, such as greater feelings of security,
which matter for couples’ childbearing decision-
making. Given that individuals’ perception of
uncertainty matters for fertility, and social trust is
important as a means to cope with uncertainty, an
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obvious extension is to consider whether social trust
matters for fertility in times of increasing uncertainty.
Our study considers a period of sudden change in
uncertainty. It considers a decade that incorporates
the financial crisis of 2008, which for many countries
extended into a more general economic crisis. Its
onset was unexpected for most households, and
other than bringing about economic hardship for
many, it also brought about an exogenous change in
uncertainty. We focus on Italian provinces during
the years 2004 to 2013, thereby incorporating the
periods before and after the financial crisis. Our
empirical analysis uses a Difference-in-Differences
approach, where treatment is defined for provinces
with high vs. low levels of trust and where we
compare fertility levels in the years before and
after the economic recession.
Our results show that fertility declined significantly
less during the crisis in the provinces endowed with
higher social trust. The effect is stronger for
younger than for older individuals, meaning that
social trust is a more pertinent mechanism to cope
with uncertainty among younger people. These
results are robust to an extensive set of sensitivity
and robustness tests, among them, the incorporation
of explicit controls for systematic differences
between provinces in both risk attitudes and family
ties. Moreover, we show that public policy—
measured in terms of childcare provision—reduces
the role of trust in maintaining fertility. That is, for
those provinces where childcare provision is ade-
quate, trust matters less in alleviating the potential
negative effect of uncertainty on fertility.
The paper provides two important contributions.
First, we demonstrate how reproductive behaviour
is affected differently by uncertainty in face of differ-
ent levels of social trust. High social trust, we argue,
levels out the negative impact of heightened uncer-
tainty and, as such, maintains fertility at a higher
level than where trust is low. In other words, we
show that social trust has a positive direct effect on
fertility by smoothing unexpected increases in uncer-
tainty. Second, we show that the fertility decline fol-
lowing an uncertainty shock is reduced through
childcare provision. There is consequently a certain
degree of substitution between policy and social
trust, in the sense that the stronger negative effects
of the recession in low trust communities are less per-
vasive if there is a strong childcare infrastructure.
The remainder of the paper is structured as
follows. The ‘Background’ section provides a
review of the literature and develops the arguments
leading to our main hypothesis that social trust mod-
erates a negative impact of uncertainty on fertility,
and a second hypothesis that public policy can
reduce the role of trust in maintaining fertility in
periods of uncertainty. The ‘Data’ and ‘Method’ sec-
tions describe the data and the identification strategy.
We then present the main results and several robust-
ness tests, followed by analyses of the complemen-
tary role of public childcare services, before
concluding.
Background
The concept of social trust can be viewed both in
terms of individual behaviour, as exemplified in the
social sciences in trust games, and as a societal
characteristic, where trust is high if the individuals
of a certain society engage in trusting behaviour
and the act of trust tends to be reciprocated (which
would mean that individuals are trustworthy).
Social trust is consequently viewed as a key ingredi-
ent of the more general concept of social capital. A
wealth of studies from across the social sciences
demonstrate the potentially favourable conse-
quences of trust. Does trust also matter for reproduc-
tive behaviour? Simple cross-sectional correlations
of fertility and average trust across countries would
suggest that it does (Aassve et al. 2016). Indeed,
countries where average trust is high, such as those
in Scandinavia, also report higher fertility. In
countries where trust is low, such as those in
Southern and Eastern Europe, fertility is lower.
Anglo-Saxon countries score relatively highly in
terms of trust, and their fertility levels are also
rather high (Aassve et al. 2016).
Still, exactly why and how trust should matter for
fertility is less explored. Here, we argue that social
trust matters for fertility when there is uncertainty.
A high level of social trust means that couples have
a broader and a more extensive network to rely on
in the communities where they live (Yamagishi and
Yamagishi 1994; Yamagishi et al. 1998) and, as
such, it acts as a coping mechanism when couples
are faced with a more uncertain future.
There is a burgeoning literature showing that per-
ceived uncertainty, frequently measured in terms of
insecure employment prospects, matters for fertility
(Goldstein et al. 2013; Graham et al. 2016; Comolli
2017), though the effect may differ by gender.
Higher perceived uncertainty among men tends to
lower fertility, whereas for women the effect is
ambiguous. In dual-earner societies, where the econ-
omic well-being of the household depends on both
partners’ incomes, the effect of perceived uncertainty
for women might be the same as for men. However,
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in societies leaning more to the traditional male
breadwinner model, job uncertainty may crowd out
women more than men, and potentially increase fer-
tility, as women withdraw from the labour market
(Raymo and Shibata 2017).
To assess the role of uncertainty on fertility, it is
important to keep in mind that children cannot be
considered as a simple consumption good, as is
common in economic analysis. In most cases, having
children involves a great deal of planning that incor-
porates a range of elements. Its irreversible nature
means that children impose substantial long-term
costs. Indeed, Ranjan (1999), drawing on the finan-
cial option theory by Dixit and Pindyck (1994), has
shown that when there is uncertainty about future
income, decision makers tend to avoid irreversible
and long-term decisions, childbearing being a prime
example. Kohler et al. (2002) have argued that econ-
omic uncertainty, caused by economic crisis or
depression, limited the childbearing of couples in
the lowest-low fertility countries. According to
these arguments, macro-level economic instability
leads to individual-level financial uncertainty, thus
delaying union formation and childbearing in early
adulthood in favour of prolonged residence in the
parental home, in the pursuit of higher education
and job stability. These arguments have been elabo-
rated in the work of Mills and Blossfeld (2013),
who argued that contemporary globalized societies
are intrinsically permeated by economic uncertainty
as they are characterized by new phenomena, includ-
ing delocalization, internationalization, and the
deregulation of the labour market. These elements
of uncertainty also affect family formation (de la
Rica and Iza 2005; Gutiérrez-Domènech 2007; Mills
and Blossfeld 2013) and are viewed by many as the
primary forces behind low fertility (Morgan et al.
2011; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Goldstein et al. 2013;
Schneider 2015).
The way through which couples perceive and deal
with increasing uncertainty varies according to their
own risk attitude and the extent of the support
network they can rely on at times of need. In light
of this, it is crucial to keep in mind that social trust
is a different concept from risk attitude or family
ties, though empirically they are often correlated. It
has long been recognized that social trust is higher
among those willing to take risks (e.g., Fehr 2009)
and lower among those with strong family ties (e.g.,
Ermisch and Gambetta 2010). Risk attitudes and
trust are correlated by definition, since trusting
unknown others necessarily entails a certain degree
of risk-taking (Bucciol et al. 2019). It is a misconcep-
tion, however, to consider trust as a specific case of
risk-taking. While risk attitudes are defined accord-
ing to individual preferences on the riskiness gener-
ated by factors unrelated to interpersonal
interactions, trust is predominantly concerned with
interpersonal interactions, thus also including a com-
ponent of social preferences. In fact, the act of trust-
ing unknown others and the attitude to risk are
generated by distinct neural and cognitive mechan-
isms (Kosfeld et al. 2005; Cesarini et al. 2008),
which are transmitted between and within gener-
ations through different channels (Dohmen et al.
2012; Ahern et al. 2014). As with risk attitudes and
trust, it is also misleading to view family ties and
social trust as the same concepts but with opposite
signs. Family ties refer to the extent to which individ-
uals rely on their family members for support. Strong
family ties would imply high trust among ‘in-group’
members. Social trust, instead, refers to the extent
to which individuals are willing to put their trust in
‘out-of-group’ members (unknown others) and, as
such, characterizes communities where families live.
Consequently, family ties and social trust can both
be strong, just as they can both be weak, though it
may also be that strong family ties bring about
lower social trust.
With respect to fertility, social trust matters as a
coping mechanism in that individuals living in high
trust communities may perceive the uncertainty
accompanying the economic crisis as being less
severe than in low trust communities. Despite the
future being objectively more uncertain for all,
those in communities with high social trust will
believe that they can cope better because they have
a broader network of individuals to rely on. This
argument rests on the idea that trust reflects favour-
able circumstances where the couple reside. These
societies are perceived as safer, because people can
trust their fellow citizens despite not knowing them
personally and, as such, these very same communities
are considered favourable grounds for raising chil-
dren in the years to come. Consequently, an increase
in perceived uncertainty about future prospects is
likely to lead to postponement of childbearing, but
less so for those couples living in communities
where social trust is strong.
An additional argument for why trust matters for
childbearing relates to external childcare facilities.
It has been argued that high trust individuals are
more willing to outsource childcare (de Ruijter and
Van der Lippe 2009; El-Attar 2013). In so far as pat-
terns of social capital are persistent over time, high
levels of trust may have spurred on the expansion
of public childcare, as women are increasingly attend-
ing higher education (Aassve et al. 2016). Whereas
Trust and fertility in uncertain times 21
easy access to childcare lowers the opportunity cost
of childcare in general (Ermisch et al. 2009), it is
also possible that the prospect of childbearing
during periods of heightened uncertainty may feel
less daunting when couples can rely on readily avail-
able childcare. Empirically, this would mean that the
effect of trust is weakened in regions where public
childcare is more extensive.
Several studies suggest that trust varies by age
(Sutter and Kocher 2007). For instance, Fehr et al.
and Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) have argued
that trusting behaviour peaks between the ages of
30 and 40, while decreasing thereafter. As for ferti-
lity, age matters in additional ways. In so far as an
increase in perceived uncertainty leads couples to
postpone childbearing, the effect might be stronger
among younger individuals. One aspect is biological,
as younger individuals simply have a longer time
available to realize their fertility plans. But younger
individuals are also often in a more precarious situ-
ation regarding jobs and careers. Since most econ-
omic recessions disproportionately affect younger
individuals, and many find themselves at the begin-
ning of their working careers not yet having achieved
job security, their perception of uncertainty may have
stronger consequences in terms of childbearing
decision-making. For older age groups, the effect
might be weaker not only because they are getting
closer to the biological limit for childbearing, but
also because they have more resources and therefore
feel the impact of increased uncertainty as less
pervasive.
Italy serves as an intriguing case study for assessing
the impact of trust on fertility during the crisis, as
there are also strong geographical variations in
trust (Putnam 1993). In the North of Italy, we find
regions in which trust is as high as in the Scandina-
vian countries and, as such, we effectively see the
North–South European gradient of trust in a single
country. Indeed, a lot has been written about trust
in Italian society and for good reason. Despite
Italian regions having shared the same state insti-
tutions, the same language, and the same religion
since unification in 1861, there has been a persistent
difference across the regions in a range of domains
(Bigoni et al. 2016) and, if anything, the gap
between the North and the South widened in the
years after the SecondWorld War. These remarkable
differences have given rise to a wealth of studies. The
traditional explanations favoured structural differ-
ences. Putnam (1993) instead argued that the differ-
ences between the good institutions of northern
Italian cities and the poor institutions of the South
date back to the Middle Ages. Following up on
Putnam’s hypothesis, Guiso et al. (2008) found that
experience of living in former free and independent
city states explains at least half of the North–South
difference in social capital. In other words, the vari-
ation in trust across Italy appears remarkably stable
over time, and may explain differences in economic
prosperity, corruption, and quality of institutions.
Recent experimental studies give further support to
these ideas. Bigoni et al. (2016) found systematic
differences between the North and the South in
terms of ability to cooperate after controlling for
geography, institutions, and crime. In a further
study they also found that the gap in cooperation
stems from individuals’ beliefs (Bigoni et al. 2017).
Italians in the South are pessimistic in their beliefs
about their own ability to cooperate with others
and they also have a stronger aversion to social
risk, both factors consistent with the idea that
family ties among them are stronger. These insights
are crucial, because in the face of an economic
shock, the negative effects may be felt more strongly
among those communities where trust is low.
Much has also been written about Italian fertility
and its peculiarities when compared with other
Western countries. After the baby boom of the 1960s,
all Western countries experienced a phase of baby
bust during the 1980s, with general postponement
and a drop in fertility. In the early 1990s, Italy and
Spain were the first countries to attain and sustain
lowest-low fertility, defined as a total fertility rate
(TFR) at or below 1.3 (Kohler et al. 2002, 2006).
Other European countries never reached such low
levels, and by the late 1990s, France, the United
Kingdom, and all the Scandinavian countries had
nearly recuperated their previous fertility levels and
were coming close to regaining the threshold of two
children per woman. Importantly, when considering
cohort fertility for these countries, the number of chil-
dren ever born towomen during their reproductive life
remained virtually unchanged. However, Italy, much
like Spain and Greece, did not recuperate in terms of
fertility. Since the 1990s, Italian fertility has increased
somewhat, peaking in 2008 at 1.45 children per
woman. After 2008, the first year that fertility would
be affected by the Great Recession, the Italian TFR
declined again, and by 2015 was back at 1.35 children
per woman, along with the highest mean age at first
child in Europe (almost 32 years). Importantly for
our study, the trend has not been homogenous across
Italian areas. Traditionally, fertility was higher in the
South of Italy. In more recent times, fertility levels
across the Italian regions have converged. But since
2008, the roles have changed and TFRs in the North
of Italy have been relatively higher (above 1.4) than
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in the South (below 1.3). Geographical differences,
with different migration rates and economic con-
ditions, might be behind this new trend, asmight differ-
ences in attitudes toward traditional Catholic union
formation. In less than two decades, births outsidemar-
riage have tripled, reaching one in three births in the
North; in the South just one in five births takes place
outside marriage.
Data
The analysis is based on a panel data set of 103 Italian
provinces, covering the years from 2004 to 2013. For
eachprovincewe collected informationon total fertility.
The dependent variable is the period TFR, which
measures the number of children that would be born
to each woman if she were to pass through her child-
bearing years in alignment with the age-specific fertility
rates (ASFRs) for each year. These data are collected
by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat).
The key explanatory variable is generalized social
trust. To construct such a variable, we rely on the
measure provided by Nannicini (2013), which is calcu-
lated from the 1990 European Values Study (EVS).
The EVS asks the question ‘Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’
Trust in each province is computed as the percentage
of people that answered ‘Most people can be
trusted’, in lieu of the alternatives ‘You can’t be too
careful’ and ‘Don’t know’. This is a standard survey
measure of trust and different versions of it are used
in many other surveys, such as the General Social
Survey and theEuropean Social Survey (ESS). Conse-
quently, this measure is used in a large number of
studies, including those listed in the previous section.
A survey question of this kind cannot be directly com-
paredwith experimental trust games. In the latter, trust
is measured by the amount player A passes on to an
unknown player B, whereas trustworthiness is
measured by the amount player B hands back to
player A. There are only a few studies that include
survey measures of trust as well as the trust game,
and there is mixed evidence as to the extent these
two measures correlate. Ermisch et al. (2009) found
weak correlations in the British Household Panel
Survey (where the survey question is asked) using a
small subsample engaged in playing a trust game; in
contrast, (Murtin et al. 2018),who rannationally repre-
sentative samples where several versions of the trust
gamewere included together with the survey question,
found that only trustworthiness in the trust game corre-
lated with the survey question on social trust.
To the best of our knowledge, trust measured at the
provincial level in Italy is only available from Nanni-
cini (2013). Information about respondents’ province
of residence was originally released by the EVS in
1990, but later retracted, and is currently unavailable.
As pointed out by Guiso et al. (2004), a potential
concern with using province-level data from the
EVS is that the Italian EVS sample of 1990 was not
stratified by its provinces. Aware of these concerns,
we address these issues by running an extensive set
of sensitivity tests in order to check how our results
vary when several other possible proxies for general-
ized trust and social capital proposed by the literature
(i.e., Guiso et al. 2004; Cartocci 2007; Nannicini et al.
2013) are taken into account. Crucially, these alterna-
tive measures are not derived from surveys but
instead from population data, and should conse-
quently be free from any bias that could be present
in the EVS sample. In addition, we also rerun the
main analysis at the NUTS II level (i.e. for 20
Italian regions) to verify its consistency with respect
to a more official source of the information contained
in the EVS about generalized trust (compared with
the data set retained by Nannicini).
The reason for using a measure of generalized
trust referring to 1990 is twofold. First, as just
noted, this is the only available measure of general-
ized trust at the Italian provincial level. Second,
using a measure referring to an earlier period
(well before the onset of the economic recession
and increase in uncertainty) reduces possible con-
cerns about endogeneity and reverse causality.
However, a possible drawback of this choice
might be that the level of trust could have genuinely
changed since 1990, thus possibly generating a
measurement error in the estimates. Unfortunately,
we cannot test this hypothesis directly at the Italian
provincial level, given the availability of this
measure for 1990 only. Nonetheless, we consider
the stability of trust at the regional level, for
which the information is indeed available from
both the EVS and ESS. In particular, Figures 1
and 2 show the percentage of people trusting
others in the 20 Italian NUTS II regions in specific
years, using information contained in both the EVS
and the ESS. We use both surveys for this exercise
to reduce the possible noise and under-represen-
tation at NUTS II level of each single survey, and
also because they provide a picture for different
years within two different time windows. Indeed,
while information in the EVS refers mainly to the
pre-crisis period, the ESS also takes into account
the post-crisis period. By looking at the linear
interpolation in each graph (solid straight lines),
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we can see they are almost flat for most of the
Italian regions, regardless of the survey. This
suggests that the level of generalized trust captured
by the survey question is pretty stable over time,
thus reassuring us about the validity of the survey
measure referring to 1990. A further corroboration
of this conclusion is provided by the analysis at
regional level discussed in Appendix A2 (in the
supplementary material), in which instead of calcu-
lating the level of trust using only the 1990 wave of
EVS, we took the average value for each region
across all the waves available for Italy before the
financial crisis: that is, for 1990, 1999, and 2005.
Admittedly, there are some regions in which trust
does seem to change within the time interval.
Such changes do not invalidate our conclusion
about the general stability of trust both before
and after the crisis. They are both negative and
positive in almost the same proportion and only
observed for the smallest regions in terms of per-
centages of the total Italian population. These
aspects, taken together, suggest that the deviations
are generated by noise due to an under-represen-
tation of these regions, as opposed to an actual
change over time in the percentage of people trust-
ing others within each region.
In order to make interpretation easier, we run our
regressions on a dichotomous version of the trust vari-
able. In other words, we distinguish provinces with
high and low trust levels according to whether they
lie in the top quartile of the trust distribution. Pro-
vinces are assigned a value equal to ‘1’ (high trust) if
they belong to the highest quartile of the trust distri-
bution (i.e. more than 38 per cent of population trust-
ing others), and ‘0’ (low trust) otherwise. Later we test
the robustness of the main results with respect to the
use of the continuous measure of trust (see Appendix
A2). Figure 3 shows the density distributions of the
TFR (panel (a)) and our measure of social trust
(panel (b)). As can be seen, the TFR distribution
approximates the normal distribution very well. Also,
the distribution of trust is similar to the normal distri-
bution, even if it is slightly more left skewed. Figure













































































Figure 1 Time trends in generalized trust for Italian regions according to the European Values Survey
Notes: The graph shows the time trends (dashed lines) in the proportion of people trusting others in each Italian region. Note
that the years with available data are not evenly spaced. The proportion is calculated using all the waves available for Italy
within the EVS. Solid straight lines represent the linear fit for each region.
Source: EVS 1990, 1999, 2005, and 2009.
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both the averageTFR in the post-crisis period andgen-
eralized social trust. Analysis of the maps shows that
provinces with a higher average TFR after the crisis
and also those with a higher level of generalized
social trust are mostly concentrated in the northern
part of the country. In general, the geographical distri-
butions of the two variables appear very similar, pro-
viding descriptive evidence in favour of our
hypothesis on the positive role of trust in smoothing
the effect of the crisis on fertility.
Social trust correlates with a range of factors. As
our interest lies in identifying whether trust by itself
can predict fertility trends, we control for those
elements that could relate both to trust and to ferti-
lity. It is important to emphasize, however, that our
measure of trust is taken from 1990, which is well
before the observational window of 2004–13. This
naturally reduces the endogeneity concerns,
especially the possibility of reversed causality.
The first group of control variables concerns the
economic characteristics of the Italian provinces.
The general economic situation within a province
can, of course, have an impact on both the opportu-
nity cost of children and on trust levels. To control
for heterogeneity in the structure of the economy,
we use data on employment levels within each
macro sector (i.e. primary, secondary, or tertiary),
as retrieved from Istat. Additionally, to take into
account the condition of the local labour market,
we include the unemployment rate among men and
women aged 15–34 years, also produced by Istat.
We check, too, for women’s participation in politics.
We might expect that with higher political partici-
pation among women, more attention would be
paid towards policies that are beneficial towards
childbearing (Catalano 2009, 2016). To proxy
women’s political participation, we use the average
percentage of councillors who are female across
municipalities within a province, which we have col-
lected from Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs. As
with the other control variables, the information is
provided for each of the years covered in our panel.
We next control for human capital, which may













































































Figure 2 Time trends in generalized trust for Italian regions according to the European Social Survey
Notes: The graph shows the time trends (dashed lines) in the proportion of people trusting others in each Italian region. Note
that the years with available data are not evenly spaced. The proportion is calculated using all the waves available for Italy
within the ESS. Solid straight lines represent the linear fit for each region. Data for Molise are missing, as are as those for
Trentino-Alto Adige for 2002 and Valle d’Aosta for 2004 and 2012.
Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2012, and 2016.
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Proportion
Figure 3 Density distributions of the TFR and generalized social trust across Italian provinces
Notes: The graph shows in panel (a) the density distribution of the average TFR in the period 2008–13 and in panel (b) the
density distribution of generalized social trust in 1990. The continuous curve represents the hypothetical normal density dis-
tribution, while the dashed curve shows the actual k-density distribution.
Source: EVS 1990, Nannicini (2013), and Istat.
Figure 4 Geographical distribution of TFR and generalized social trust across Italian provinces
Notes: The map shows in panel (a) the quartile of the distribution of the average TFR at the provincial level during the period
2008–13 while in panel (b) the quartile of the distribution of trust at the provincial level in 1990. The more intense the shading
colour of a province, the higher the quartile it belongs to. Provinces where data about generalized social trust are unavailable
are coloured black in the maps.
Source: As for Figure 3.
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and Dalla Zuanna 2017) and trust (Alesina and La
Ferrara 2002; Jones 2008). Since there are no available
data on education across provinces for a sufficient
number of years, we create instead a proxy for edu-
cation using newspaper circulation for each province.
Specifically, we use the total number of newspapers
sold (per 1,000 inhabitants) at year-province level.
The data are collected by the Italian National Press
Agency (Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa).
To account for differences in the resources avail-
able for public spending by local government, we
again use information provided by the Italian Minis-
try of Internal Affairs, from which we create a
dummy variable equal to ‘1’ for provinces showing
political alignment between the incumbent govern-
ments at provincial, regional, and national levels
(Bracco et al. 2013), and ‘0’ otherwise. Lastly, in
some of the robustness tests we also control for
changes in risk aversion at different points in time
and for strength of family ties. To construct the first
variable, we rely on the question about risk aversion
provided in the 2004 Survey on Household Income
and Wealth (SHIW) by the Bank of Italy. For the
measure of strength of family ties, we rely on the
work of Alesina and Giuliano (2010) and use the
information provided in the EVS of 1990 and 1999.
A key variable for our analysis is the availability of
childcare services, such as public nursery schools.
These services provide support for parents by
enabling them to outsource childcare, thus poten-
tially encouraging parents to have more children
(Aassve et al. 2016). However, the availability of
well-functioning public services might be a result of
high trust (Bjornskov and Tinggaard Svendsen
2009; de Ruijter and Van der Lippe 2009; El-Attar
2013). In our analysis we use information provided
by Istat to create a variable that measures the percen-
tage of municipalities providing childcare services
within a province.
A complete list and description of all variables
employed in the main analysis, and those used in the
sensitivity and robustness tests, is provided in Appen-
dix A1 (in the supplementary material), together with
their original sources. Table 1 displays summary stat-
istics for the final sample. It includes only 80 pro-
vinces, since we lack information about trust for 21
provinces and on the presence of missing values
among the control variables for two provinces.
Method
The financial crisis of 2008 negatively affected the
Italian economy and the resources available both
for industries and households, thus increasing the
general level of economic uncertainty across the
country. The shock induced by the crisis was not
anticipated by Italians, since it started in the United
States and only then spread to the rest of the
world. This implies that the shock can be reasonably
assumed to have been exogenous with respect to
both the distribution of trust across Italian provinces
and specific socio-economic confounders affecting
the relationship between trust and the TFR.
To provide a sense of the impact of the crisis on the
Italian economic environment and the uncertainty
experienced by Italian households, we plot in
Figure 5 the average trend for high and low trust pro-
vinces in: (a) gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita in purchasing power parity using 2010 as the
base year; and (b) the unemployment rate. Looking
at the pre-crisis period, we can see that GDP per
capita increased up to 2007 when its upward trend
stopped, supporting the idea that the shock was
exogenous. Such an interpretation is further
reinforced by looking at the unemployment rate,
which instead systematically decreased during the
same period. Both trends reversed from 2008
onward with a shrinking in GDP per capita and a dra-
matic increase in the unemployment rate.
Importantly for our identification, the trends are
homogeneous across the two types of province,
suggesting that the change in households’ economic
and labour conditions induced by the crisis was
similar between provinces with high and low
levels of generalized social trust. In Appendix A2
of the supplementary material we present a formal
test for this.
The setting lends itself to a Difference-in-Differ-
ences (DiD) approach, where provinces with high
generalized trust are assigned to the treatment
group, while provinces with a lower level of trust
are placed in the control group. We compare the
TFR between these two groups, both before and
after 2008. Figure 6 informs us about the validity
of the parallel trends assumption (a formal test of
this assumption is provided in the next section). In
pre-crisis times, the TFR trend for provinces with
a high level of trust mimicked the trend for low
trust provinces fairly well. The general effect of
the crisis is detectable in the TFRs of both groups
of provinces, starting from 2008. Since the crisis
actually began in the second half of 2007, any
potential effect on individuals’ childbearing out-
comes can only be detected from 2008 onwards,
given the natural lag of nine months between the
start of a pregnancy and the birth of the child.
For this reason we consider 2008 as the first year
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of the post-crisis period. The average TFR among
provinces belonging to the control (low trust)
group stopped increasing abruptly in 2008, while
for provinces with high levels of trust it continued
to rise up to 2010, but at a slower rate. Here we
see the possible role played by trust in smoothing
the increase of economic uncertainty induced by
the crisis. After 2010, the TFRs of both types of
provinces started to decline.
The DiD framework is summarized by the follow-
ing equation:.
TFRi,t = b0 + b1Trusti × Crisist + X ′i,tb+ ai
+ gt + ei,t (1)
where i defines the province and t the year. The aim is
to consistently estimate the coefficient b1, which rep-
resents the effect of the interaction between our
Table 1 Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables for Italian provinces 2004–13
Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 1.36 0.13 0.93 1.74
Trust 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.85
Risk aversion 3.38 0.33 1.95 4.00
Strength of family ties 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Distribution of childcare services (proportion) 0.52 0.29 0.02 1.00
Unemployment: males aged 15–34 (proportion) 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.47
Unemployment: females aged 15–34 (proportion) 0.22 0.12 0.02 0.56
Employment: secondary sector (proportion) 0.30 0.09 0.13 0.53
Employment: tertiary sector (proportion) 0.66 0.08 0.46 0.85
Percentage of female councillors 0.19 0.06 0.05 0.36
Political alignment 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Newspaper circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants) 101 46 27 446
Note: Summary statistics are calculated for a sample of 800 observations, that is, for 80 Italian provinces observed yearly during the period
2004–13. Further information on variables can be found in the ‘Data’ section and in the supplementary material (Appendix A1). We lack
information about trust for 21 other provinces (Agrigento, Benevento, Biella, Brindisi, Chieti, Crotone, Forlì-Cesena, Grosseto, Imperia,
Isernia, Nuoro, Parma, Pesaro and Urbino, Pistoia, Pordenone, Prato, Ragusa, Rimini, Siracusa, Teramo, and Venice) and the presence
of missing values among the control variables for two other provinces (Enna and Bolzano).
Source: See Appendix A1 in the supplementary material.
Figure 5 The impact of the 2008 financial crisis on the Italian economy and labour market, 2004–13
Notes: Panel (a) shows the yearly trend in GDP per capita in purchasing power parity with 2010 as the base year, while panel
(b) shows the trend in the unemployment rate. The vertical line indicates the beginning of the financial turmoil in 2007.
Source: Istat.
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treatment Trusti (being a province in the highest
quartile of trust distribution) and Crisist (an indicator
variable for the post-crisis period). The coefficient
identifies the different trend in the TFR in provinces
characterized by different trust levels once the crisis
hit. Equation (1) contains province fixed effects
(ai) to take into account time-invariant heterogen-
eity at the provincial level, and also year fixed
effects (gt) to consider common shocks across pro-
vinces. The matrix Xi,t contains time-varying con-
founders at the provincial level that might affect
the TFR and the level of trust as described pre-
viously. We include all the variables introduced in
the ‘Data’ section, together with the dummy variable
Crisist. In the specifications with year fixed effects,
we do not include the indicator variable Crisist,
since it is strongly correlated with the year
dummies. Finally, standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the provincial
level to account for serial correlation.
The effect of trust on fertility in uncertain
times
The estimates from Equation (1) are reported in
Table 2. The model in column (1) includes province
fixed effects. Column (2) includes province fixed
effects and also the full set of controls previously
described in the ‘Data’ section, while column (3) aug-
ments the model in column (2) by also adding year
fixed effects. Column (3) is referred to as the com-
plete model. Results support the initial thesis that
the TFRs of provinces with high trust levels are
affected less by the onset of the crisis. Specifically,
the effect of trust corresponds to a lesser decline in
TFR during the crisis, ranging from 3.1 to 3.4 percen-
tage points, with the complete model showing a value
of 3.1 percentage points.
To obtain further insights about the timing of the
effect, we run a slightly different specification of
the DiD model, including leads and lags. By analys-
ing leads we run a formal test for the validity of the
parallel trends assumption in the pre-crisis period,
whereas lags allow for an assessment of the duration
of the effect, and give a sense of the extent to which
the effect changes over time (Autor 2003). The model
with leads and lags is as follows:.
TFRi,t = b0 +
∑2013
j=2004
b1,jTrusti ×Yeart + X ′i,tb
+ ai + gt + ei,t (2)
where the coefficients β1,j represent the interaction
between the presence of a high level of trust in pro-
vince i and the indicator variables for each year t.
Table 3 presents the estimates both for the model
without controls except for year and province fixed
effects, and for the complete model, while Figure 7
gives a graphical representation of the latter. Pro-
vinces with high and low levels of trust were perform-
ing similarly before 2008, with all the coefficients
small in size and not statistically significant. The
interaction term Trusti ×Yeart becomes significant
from 2008 onwards and peaks in 2011.
We run separate estimations for the ASFRs con-
sistent with an equation like (1). The estimates are
made for the age groups 17–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–
39, and 40–50 years. These additional regressions
provide further insights into the heterogeneous
Figure 6 Trends in TFR 2004–13 for two groups of Italian provinces by level of trust
Notes: The comparison is between provinces within the lowest three quartiles of the trust distribution (Low trust, solid line)
and those belonging to the highest quartile (High trust, dashed line).
Source: As for Figure 5.
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effects of trust on fertility as uncertainty increased
due to the economic downturn. In addition, the
regressions act as a placebo test for the empirical
method. That is, if the detected effect indeed
depends on the role of trust (by alleviating the
impact of the crisis on fertility in terms of economic
uncertainty) we should observe the coefficient of
social trust decreasing with age and becoming
Table 2 Difference-in-Differences estimates for the TFR in Italian provinces 2004–13: baseline results
(1) (2) (3)






Controls NO YES YES
Year fixed effects NO NO YES
Province fixed effects YES YES YES
No. observations 800 800 800
No. provinces 80 80 80
R2 0.387 0.426 0.565
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
Notes: The dependent variable is the Total Fertility Rate. The variable T rust ×Crisis is the interaction of the treatment (a dummy taking the
value of ‘1’ for a province in the highest quartile of distribution of generalized social trust) with Crisis (a dummy taking the value ‘1’ for the
years 2008–13). The set of controls includes the percentage of municipalities with childcare services, average percentage of municipal
councillors who are female, percentage employed in the secondary sector, percentage employed in the tertiary sector, unemployment
rate for males aged 15–34, unemployment rate for females aged 15–34, newspaper circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants), and a dummy for
political alignment between central and local administrations. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the data described in Appendix A1 (in the supplementary material).
Table 3 Difference-in-Differences estimates for the TFR in Italian provinces 2004–13, with the inclusion of leads and lags
(1) (2)
Trust × 2004 −0.0083 −0.0045
(0.0144) (0.0142)
Trust × 2005 −0.0092 −0.0063
(0.0108) (0.0101)
Trust × 2006 0.0102 0.0138
(0.0084) (0.0091)
Trust × 2008 0.0173* 0.0183*
(0.0099) (0.0108)
Trust × 2009 0.0340** 0.0313**
(0.0136) (0.0143)
Trust × 2010 0.0367*** 0.0336***
(0.0113) (0.0124)
Trust × 2011 0.0437*** 0.0408***
(0.0121) (0.0131)
Trust × 2012 0.0323** 0.0325**
(0.0142) (0.0154)
Trust × 2013 0.0315** 0.0357*
(0.0152) (0.0175)
Controls NO YES
Year fixed effects YES YES
Province fixed effects YES YES
No. observations 800 800
No. provinces 80 80
R2 0.547 0.568
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
Notes: The dependent variable is the Total Fertility Rate. The variable Trust × Crisis is the interaction of the treatment (a dummy taking the
value of ‘1’ for a province in the highest quartile of distribution of generalized social trust) with indicator variables for each year 2004 to 2013.
The omitted category is the interaction between Trust and the dummy for the year 2007 (the year before the outbreak of the crisis). Column
(2) includes controls for the percentage of municipalities with childcare services, average percentage of municipal councillors who are female,
percentage employed in the secondary sector, percentage employed in the tertiary sector, unemployment rate for both males and females
aged 15–34, newspaper circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants), and a dummy for political alignment between central and local
administrations. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.
Source: As for Table 2.
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insignificant for the oldest age group. After all, those
in the oldest age group are both more likely to have a
permanent job and to be at the end of their natural
reproductive period, thus would be less affected by
the increasing uncertainty induced by the crisis.
This means that we would expect any decision on
their part to have a child to be less dependent on
trust, thus showing an insignificant coefficient for
the oldest age group. The results are given in Table
4 and confirm this hypothesis. After the ASFR
peaks for the 25–29 age group, the coefficients
decline, and for the oldest age groups (35–39 and
40–50-year-olds) the effect is no longer significant.
In other words, the effect of trust in stabilizing ferti-
lity after the economic crisis declines with age. Inter-
estingly, we do not find any significant effect for the
youngest individuals (aged 17–24). Many of these
were still in education during the crisis, which made
them less sensitive to a sudden increase in uncer-
tainty in terms of fertility, simply because they
would not yet have considered childbearing as part
of their choice set.
In the next section we discuss how the effect
detected in the baseline varies according to the
level of public childcare provision, while in Appendix
A2 of the supplementary material we provide an
extensive set of further checks in order to validate
our identification strategy, as well as to test the
robustness of the baseline estimates.
Social trust, childcare policy, and fertility
So far, we have found robust evidence that a sudden
hike in uncertainty depressed fertility more in low
trust areas than in those with a higher level of trust.
We have suggested that this effect occurred through
a stronger perception of the uncertainty connected
to childbearing decision-making, which in turn
increased due to the negative economic shock. That
is, in a low trust setting, individuals’ perceptions of
increasing uncertainty following the economic crisis
are stronger if they consider the support they can
receive from their community to be lower. As we
have argued, this relationship is potentially modified
once we take into account public policies explicitly
aimed at easing child-rearing. One example of such
a policy is the availability of public childcare services,
which is likely to affect individuals’ opportunity costs
of having a child by reducing the uncertainty associ-
ated with reconciling work and family life. Our
hypothesis is that if the direct impact of trust on fer-
tility acts to smooth the increased uncertainty due to
the crisis, then its effect should be weaker when indi-
viduals are provided with more extensive public
childcare services. To test this hypothesis, we
implement a triple Difference-in-Differences estima-
tor based on the following specification:.
TFRi,t = b0 + b1Trusti × Crisist + b2DCSi,2003
× Crisist + b3Trusti ×DCSi,2003
× Crisist + X ′i,tb+ ai + gt + ei,t (3)
where the distribution of childcare services (DCS),
here measured by the percentage of municipalities
providing childcare services within each province
in 2003, is interacted with both Crisist and
Trusti × Crisist. The results are presented in
Table 5, in which column (1) reports the estimates
of the model with just province fixed effects, and
Figure 7 Difference-in-Differences estimates with leads and lags
Notes: The figure shows the point estimates of the model in Table 3 and the confidence intervals at 90 per cent (least wide
spikes), 95 per cent (medium width spikes), and 99 per cent (widest spikes). The omitted category is the interaction between
Trust and the dummy for the year 2007.
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the data described in Appendix A1 (in the supplementary material).
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column (2) gives those of the model adding time-
varying controls, while column (3) shows the com-
plete specification including year fixed effects. The
coefficients presented in the complete model
strongly support our hypothesis that trust and the
provision of public services are substitutes. The
interaction between Trusti and Crisist remains posi-
tive, confirming that for provinces without any pro-
vision of public childcare services, trust has a strong
effect on the TFR.
The coefficient of the interaction between Crisist
and DCSi,2003 is also significantly positive and sub-
stantial, meaning that in provinces with low trust
levels the availability of this type of public service
counters the negative effect of the crisis on fertility.
On the contrary, the triple interaction is negative,
sizable, and statistically significant, clearly indicating
a substitutability between trust and the availability of
public childcare services in reducing the negative
impact of the crisis on the TFR. In other words, in
Table 4 Difference-in-Differences estimates for ASFRs in Italian provinces 2004–13
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age group 17–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–50
Trust × Crisis 0.0042 0.0134** 0.0085*** 0.0038 0.0015
(0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0012)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Province fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
No. observations 800 800 800 800 800
No. provinces 80 80 80 80 80
R2 0.282 0.174 0.348 0.794 0.789
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
Notes: The dependent variables are age-specific fertility rates for ages 17–24 in column (1), 25–29 in column (2), 30–34 in column (3), 35–39 in
column (4), and 40–50 in column (5). The variable Trust × Crisis is the interaction of the treatment (a dummy taking the value of ‘1’ for a
province in the highest quartile of distribution of generalized social trust) with Crisis (a dummy taking the value ‘1’ for the years 2008–
13). The set of controls includes the percentage of municipalities with childcare services, average percentage of municipal councillors who
are female, percentage employed in the secondary sector, percentage employed in the tertiary sector, unemployment rate for both males
and females aged 15–34, newspaper circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants), and a dummy for political alignment between central and local
administrations. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.
Source: As for Table 2.
Table 5 Triple Difference-in-Differences estimates for the TFR in Italian provinces 2004–13: the effect of trust for different
levels of childcare services
(1) (2) (3)














Controls NO YES YES
Year fixed effects NO NO YES
Province fixed effects YES YES YES
No. observations 800 800 800
No. provinces 80 80 80
R2 0.475 0.460 0.600
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed tests).
Notes: The dependent variable is the Total Fertility Rate. The variable Trust × Crisis is the interaction of the treatment, (a dummy taking the
value of ‘1’ for a province in the highest quartile of distribution of generalized social trust) with Crisis (a dummy taking the value ‘1’ for the
years 2008–13). The variable DCS2003 × Crisis is the interaction of DCS2003 (a variable that measures the percentage of municipalities with
active childcare services within a province in 2003) with Crisis. The variable T rust × Crisis ×DCS2003 is the interaction of the three variables
listed above. The set of controls includes the percentage of municipalities with childcare services, average percentage of municipal councillors
who are female, percentage employed in the secondary sector, percentage employed in the tertiary sector, unemployment rate for both males
and females aged 15–34, newspaper circulation (per 1,000 inhabitants), and a dummy for political alignment between central and local
administrations. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level.
Source: As for Table 2.
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provinces where the uncertainty of reconciling
working and family life is lower, given more easily
accessible public childcare services, the role of gener-
alized social trust in smoothing the uncertainty
induced by the crisis is reduced, compared with pro-
vinces without public childcare services. This last
result is summarized in Figure 8, which shows both
the linear and quadratic average marginal effects of
generalized social trust in the post-crisis period
according to different levels of childcare provision.
The graph suggests that the role of trust in stabilizing
the negative impact of the crisis strongly decreases as
the level of childcare provided by public institutions
in each province increases, and also shows the
absence of any non-linearity in such a relationship.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided further evidence
that social trust matters for reproductive behaviour.
The role of trust has been extensively studied in the
social sciences, but much less is known about its
potential for explaining fertility trends. Here, we
have presented robust evidence that during an
economic downturn, lower trust brings about
lower fertility. We have argued that the underlying
mechanism occurs through individuals’ and
couples’ perceptions of uncertainty. When the
sense of uncertainty is heightened, couples tend to
postpone commitments that may have long-term
consequences for their family life. Our analysis
also shows that the negative effect of the economic
downturn in low trust areas is buffered by the avail-
ability of childcare services. This makes sense
because the opportunity cost of childbearing will
be lower when parents with young children can
rely on publicly provided childcare to a greater
extent. The economic downturn may affect their
job opportunities and their consumption habits,
but, all else being equal, the cost of child-rearing
will be lower when there are childcare facilities in
place. This is encouraging news, in the sense that
it suggests that negative effects can be counterba-
lanced through appropriate policy interventions,
not least through an expansion of public childcare.
We should also reflect on the fact that the differen-
tial effects of the economic crisis for low trust pro-
vinces vs. high trust provinces appear to be long-
lasting. Whereas the effect was particularly notice-
able between 2007 and 2008, and again between
2008 and 2009, the estimates of the leads and lags
(shown in Table 3) indicate no trace of any narrowing
of the gap between high and low trust provinces.
Additional structural features explain this persist-
ency. In 2011, Italy was exposed to the sovereign
debt crisis, which led to the collapse of the elected
government of the time. This was followed by a
pension reform, and then a significant labour
market reform introduced in 2014. Whereas these
reforms cannot be considered exogenous, they
might have sustained the sense of uncertainty, there-
fore maintaining the long-term differences between
low and high trust areas in terms of their fertility
trends. All of this suggests that fertility in low trust
areas is unlikely to rebound any time soon.
Our study also begs the question of whether social
trust has mattered for the broader fertility differen-
tials observed across Western societies in recent
decades. Kohler et al. (2002) argued that fertility
Figure 8 Average marginal effects of trust in post-crisis times
Notes: The figure shows the average linear and quadratic marginal effects on the TFR of being a high trust province by differ-
ent levels of public childcare provision, together with the 95 per cent confidence intervals. Public childcare provision is
measured as the proportion of municipalities providing childcare services within each province.
Source: As for Figure 7.
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decline came about from a new wave of economic
uncertainty associated with new technology and a
rapidly shifting labour market. Similarly, Mills and
Blossfeld (2013) argued that globalization brings
about stronger uncertainty through delocalization,
internationalization, and the deregulation of the
labour market. As such, our analysis suggests that
in fertility terms, there are winners and losers in the
new regime of uncertainty, but that trust appears to
have played an important role.
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